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Abstract
This paper considers a two-sector education model with two novel features. First,
contracts have an independent role in sorting workers into diﬀerent sectors of the
economy. Second, education improves workers’ awareness of their abilities, and
hence can improve the allocation of talent by making workers’ choice of sector better
informed. The implication is that the most able skip education, which stands in con-
trast to results from established theories of education. In the extension, we consider
the case when education improves productivity directly, in addition to improving
information. Using this extension, we compare the UK and the US undergraduate
systems, and moreover analyze hybrid educational systems from Europe, that oﬀer
both UK and US types of undergraduate degrees.
1 Introduction
An important determinant of the prosperity of an economy is how well its labor markets
allocate the pool of workers with heterogenous talent to appropriate sectors or jobs of
∗Thanks to Ken Binmore, Lorne Carmichael, Eddie Dekel, Chaim Fershtman, Todd Kaplan, Eirik
G. Kristiansen, Terje Lensberg, Trond E. Olsen, Gaute Torsvik, Manuel Trajtenberg, Bertil Tungodden,
Yoram Weiss, and particularly to an extremely helpful referee for comments. Also thanks to seminar
and conference participants in Beer Sheva, Bergen, Berlin, Copenhagen, Haifa, Oslo, Stockholm, and
Tel-Aviv. I gratefully acknowledge the hospitality of the Berglas School of Economics in Tel Aviv.
†Assistant Professor, Department of Finance and Managment, Norwegian School of Economics and
Business, Helleveien 30, 5045 Bergen, Norway. Email: hans.hvide@nhh.no.
1
the economy. One such market is the market for experienced workers, where workers
change jobs according to their preferences and productive abilities. The purpose of this
paper is to study how education shapes the allocation of talent. Surprisingly, established
theories of education focus on reduced-form specifications or one-sector models that do
not obviously allow such analysis.
To model the link between education and the allocation of talent, we add two novel,
and we think realistic, features to a two-sector Spence (1974) type of education model. The
structure of the paper is to first analyze the eﬀects from introducing these two features,
and then to extend the model to make it more applicable.
First we enrich the contractual space by allowing firms to oﬀer credential contracts,
where a worker’s education level determines his pay (as in Spence), but also performance
contracts, where performance in the job determines pay. Performance contracts imply that
workers have the option to educate or not before entering a certain sector or job type.
For example, for many jobs within business, an MBA degree may be commendable but is
not required. Second, we explicitly take into consideration the old educator’s argument
that workers acquire information about their abilities through educating. For example,
an MBA degree may learn an engineering graduate whether his talents lie within Project
Managment or within Finance.
Performance contracts aﬀect the allocation of workers through giving workers incentive
to choose the sector where they are most productive, given their available information.
Education, on the other hand, aﬀects the allocation of talent through making workers
choice of sector better informed; a worker may change his opinion about which sector to
work in after undertaking education. Education may also aﬀect the allocation of talent
through providing the worker with a signal that he belongs to an able cohort of workers.
The model encompasses equilibria where the motive behind education is signaling, but
the focus of the analysis will be on equilibria where the role of education is information
acquisition.
In information acquisition equilibria, those with intermediate confidence educate (be-
fore choosing sector and contract), while the least and the most confident skip education.
The intuition is that those with intermediate confidence have a higher valuation of ed-
ucation than those with low or high confidence, who are already quite sure who they
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are. Those who are sure who they are skip education and start working in one of the
sectors directly. Signaling equilibria are also consistent with the mediocre educating and
the most able skipping education. The intuition here is that the most able skip education
because those in the middle can imitate too cheaply, while those in the middle educate to
distinguish themselves from the least able.
An extension considers the more realistic case when education has a direct eﬀect
on a worker’s productivity. It is shown that the most able may still skip education, and
conditions for when this result is reversed is considered. At a more applied level, we adapt
the model to discuss the relative merit of the US and the UK undergraduate university
education, and to analyze educational systems not uncommon in Europe, where US and
UK type of undergraduate degrees co-exist.
Other realistic features omitted from the basic model, such that eﬀort interacts with
ability in determining production, and risk aversion, is also discussed in the extension.
Weiss (1983) extends the Spence (1973) signaling model to a setting where agents
have superior, but imperfect, information about their own abilities, and moreover where
students undergo a final test after educating (the result of the test is public information).
Weiss (1983) focuses on the existence of separating equilibria where diﬀerent belief types
choose diﬀerent length of education (there is a continuum of education levels). The model
of Weiss has only one sector and one labor contract type. Therefore, Weiss (1983) is silent
on the information acquisition role of education and its welfare properties, and also on
the endogenous choice of labor contracts, which are main issues in the present paper. The
same neglect hold for two recent surveys of the economics of education literature, Blaug
(1992) and Weiss (1995).1 To our knowledge, the only education model where education
explicitly has a role in allocating talent occurs in Spence (1974). However, Spence (1974)
does not consider the information acquisition role of education, and neither considers
the possibility that contracts may serve to sort workers. Stiglitz (1975) and MacDonald
(1983) mention the information acquisition role of education, but only en passant.
A parallel paper, Grossman (1999), also considers an adverse selection setting how
1Fershtman, Murphy and Weiss (1996) consider the eﬀect of education on the allocation of talent (and
growth) when workers care about their relative status, in addition to their material payoﬀ. Fershtman et
al. focus on the productivity-augmenting role of education under perfect labor contracts, in contrast to
our focus on the informational role of education under imperfect labor contracts.
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contracts have an independent role in the allocation of talent. Along with the present
paper, it seems that Grossman (1999) is the first work that studies a model where workers
have private information about their abilities, and where the type of labor contracts em-
ployed is endogenously determined. While we focus on the interaction between contracts
and education, Grossman (1999) focuses on the interaction between contracts and trade
between nations, in a diﬀerent type of model.2 The individuals allocating themselves into
diﬀerent sectors in Grossman’s model have no possible signals available, and moreover
know exactly who they are, so there is no information acquisition possible either.
Starting with the seminal works Fama (1980) and Holmstrom (1982/1999), there is
a large recent literature on career concerns and market learning about the abilities of
managers. This literature considers learning about abilities under symmetric information
models, with signaling motives hence excluded.3 Prendergast and Stole (1996) and Avery
and Chevalier (1999) are related to the present work in considering private learning.
However, neither paper consider the contractual response by firms to workers’ private
information.4 Hence the present paper can be seen as extending the theory of career
concerns to a setting with private learning and with more realistic assumptions about
contracts.
Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 contains the basic results, Section 4 considers
extensions, and Section 5 concludes. Some proofs are relegated to Appendices A and B.
2 The Model
Production Technology. There are two sectors in the economy, sector N and sector S. In
each sector there are several risk-neutral firms, and wages are set competitively. There is a
2The idea that contracts can aﬀect the allocation of talent goes back at least to Murphy et al. (1991).
For example Murphy et al. (1991) state on p. 513: ’In fact, diﬀerences in contracts between industries are
as important or more important than physical diminishing returns to scale [for the allocation of talent]’.
3See e.g., Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Dewatripont et al. (1999a) and
(1999b), Morris (2001), and Altonji and Pierret (2001).
4For both papers it is not obvious what equilibria would look like if contract employed emerged
endogenously from the behavior of firms rather than being taken as given. Avery and Chevalier (1999)
assume that managers maximize their reputation when choosing between alternative investment projects,
while Prendergast and Stole (1996) assume that managers maximize a function that weighs both current
period profits of the firm and the manager’s reputation in the market.
4
continuum of risk-neutral workers of measure 1, where each worker has either low ability
or high ability. The share of high ability workers equals θ. Each worker is employed
for one period of time in one of the sectors. In sector N, both types of workers have
productivity πN . In sector S, the low type has productivity πL, whereas the high type
has productivity πH , where πL < πN < πH . For simplicity, normalize πL to zero. The
case when productivity is determined by both productivity type and eﬀort is considered
in an extension.
Compensation Contracts. In the N sector, a worker’s productivity is known to be πN ,
so all workers are oﬀered the wage πN , independently of whether they are educated or not.
In the S sector, worker productivity is unknown, and firms oﬀer two types of contracts
to attract able workers: performance contracts and credential contracts. A performance
contract pays a worker according to a (possibly noisy, but unbiased) estimate of the
production of the worker. The estimate costs m > 0 per worker to obtain (referred to
as the cost of monitoring). Let b, where b ∈ [0, 1], be the belief of a worker, prior to
educating, that he is the high type. Thus b is the confidence level of the worker. Hence
the value of a performance contract in the S sector for a worker with belief b equals
bπH − m. A credential contract conditions wage upon the education level of a worker,
and gives a worker with education level e the wage w(e), where e ∈ {0, 1, ..., K}.5
Education. For convenience, there are only two education levels, thus we set K = 1.6
For simplicity, assume that firms only oﬀer credential contracts to workers with education
level e=1.7 It is assumed that a worker who educates acquires information about his
ability type through how hard he must work to complete the degree. Eﬀort is costly to a
worker, and the amount of eﬀort required is assumed to be correlated with the worker’s
true type: if a worker’s true productivity is low, then more likely he has to work hard
to finish the degree, while if the worker’s true productivity is high, then more likely he
5A continuum of education levels would open up for signaling equilibria where each belief type choose
a diﬀerent education level, as in Weiss (1983). Since the focus of the paper is on equilibria where the
motive behind education is learning (not signaling), however, not much is lost through taking education
level to be a discrete variable.
6If agents can committ to a short or a long education at time 1, there can exist equilibria, qualitatively
similar to those obtained, where agents with a long education is oﬀered a more lucrative credential contract
than workers with a short education. Cases where workers cannot precommit to an education length are
studied by Nöldeke et al. (1990) and Swinkels (1999).
7This follows from an equilibrium argument, for θ not too high.
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can obtain the degree with less work.8 Formally, the (non-pecuniary) cost of educating
for an individual is an independent realization of a random variable X . For simplicity,
it is assumed that X can take just two values, cL and cH , where cH < cL. Hence, the
realization X = cH can be interpreted as good news about ability for the worker, and the
realization X = cL can be interpreted as bad news about ability. If the worker has high
ability, good news occurs with probability p, and bad news occurs with probability 1− p.
But if the worker has low ability, then bad news occurs with probability p, and good news
with probability 1− p, where 1
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< p ≤ 1. The larger p, the more informative is X. In the
basic model, the only form of human capital acquired from education is information about
abilities. An extension considers the case when education also augments the productivity
of a worker.
Information
Two limit informational assumptions are considered. In the first case, all information
received by a worker, both at the interim stage between birth and education, and at the
education stage, is public. This will be referred to as the public information case. In the
second limit case, all information received by a worker, both before and during education,
is private to a worker. Hence in this private information case, firms only know θ, the
distribution of X , and whether a worker is educated or not.9 Cases with partly private,
partly public information resembles more the pure private information case and will be
considered later.
Under private information, the education level of the worker is the only individual-
specific information a credential contract can be conditioned on. In the public information
case, where workers and firms are equally well informed, firms can oﬀer a (fixed) wage
conditional on the commonly known estimate b of a worker’s ability. Since b is a suﬃcient
statistic for ability, a worker’s education level will not give independent information about
his ability, and hence will not be contracted upon under public information. To demar-
8There are many other ways education can make a worker learn about his abilities, e.g., through
grades obtained and feedback from other students and teachers. I choose to view the feedback through
the lense of the cost of education for tractability reasons; the results do not depend on it.
9We implicitly assume that firms cannot have better information than a worker about that worker’s
ability. As pointed out by a referee, a situation where firms know more than workers is not necessar-
ily implausible. For example, financial firms employing physicists may know more about their future
prospects in the finance industry than the physicists know themselves.
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cate the contracts with fixed pay under public information from the private information
credential contracts, for clarity label the former fixed wage contracts.
Timing. Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events.
0
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born with 
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Workers receive 
info about their 
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1
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Figure 1: Timing of Events
At time 0, workers are born with a common prior θ. Between time 0 and time 1,
workers receive imperfect information about their abilities, on which they update their
prior θ, and form the belief b. The information received between time 0 and time 1 may be
thought of as learning from compulsory education.10 At time 1, firms oﬀer employment
contracts to workers. At time 2, workers choose whether to educate or not, given the
oﬀered contracts and their confidence level b. Workers that do not educate choose sector at
time 2.11 Workers that educate do so between time 2 and time 3, and receive information
about their abilities when doing so. Such workers delay choosing sector and contract
until time 3. At time 3, all workers are employed for one period, and then wages are
paid, according to the contract.12 All discounting factors are set to one. Notice that
the equilibrium sorting at time 2 uniquely determines the allocation of workers, i.e., the
fractions of workers that are employed in the diﬀerent sectors at time 3 (and on which
type of contract).13
10There are a variety of other possible interpretations of the information received between time 0 and
time 1. For example, the learning may come from parental guidance. Alternatively, we may think of the
model as analyzing the decision to undertake ’higher’ education (like an MBA degree), and where the
information received between time 0 and time 1 reflects learning from undergraduate work (and where
all student start their undergraduate career with a common prior θ).
11It makes no diﬀerence to the results whether those without education decide which sector to work in
at time 2 or at time 3. For ease of exposition, I choose the former.
12Hence workers that do not educate stand idle for one period. This assumption is meant to capture a
situation where the duration of the period of work is (much) longer than the duration of education.
13Although the sorting choice at time 3 for an individual that chooses to educate is stochastic, the
fractions (for each confidence level b at time 2) that choose the diﬀerent alternatives after education are
deterministic.
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Since agents receive diﬀerent information between time 0 and time 1, their confidence
levels diﬀer at the education decision at time 2; some agents will be underconfident (i.e.,
have a too low opinion about themselves), and some workers will be overconfident (i.e.,
have a too high opinion about themselves). While there is nothing suspicious about
underconfidence and overconfidence at the individual level, an interesting question is
whether imperfect beliefs at the aggregate level ’cancel out’ at the population level, and,
if yes, in which sense. This question will be addressed under 2.1.
2.1 Preliminaries
First we derive an individual worker’s payoﬀ under private information, for a given cre-
dential wage w(1), written just w. The full expressions are relegated to Appendix B. At
time 2, a worker has three diﬀerent possible actions; to skip education and choose the N
sector, to skip education and choose the S sector, and to educate. Since wages are compet-
itive, the expected utility from choosing sector N equals πN , and the expected utility from
choosing a the S sector equals b πH −m. The expected utility from educating depends
on whether w > πN or w < πN . When w < πN , signaling motives behind education are
excluded, and the motive behind education can only be information acquisition: choose
the N sector at time 3 if education gives bad news about ability, and choose a performance
contract (in the S sector) at time 3 if education gives good news about ability. When
w > πN , a worker can educate to signal his favorable private information, i.e., educate
and then choose a credential contract in the S sector independently of the information he
gets from educating.14 In that case, the expected utility from educating equals w − c(b),
where c(b) denotes the expected cost of education for a worker with self-confidence b.
An equilibrium includes firms’ oﬀer of w, and the beliefs supporting this oﬀer. Denote
the average productivity of those that accept a credential contract by α. Holding α
constant at α¯, competitive wage setting implies w = α¯, i.e., a wage equal to average
productivity. But clearly α depends on w through some function α(w; ..), since changes
in w aﬀects the composition of the group that educates. A firm’s decision about which
14A diﬀerent possibility when w > πN is that a worker undertakes education both to acquire information
and to signal, i.e., to choose a performance contract in the S sector if the news are good, and a credential
contract in the S sector if the news are bad. This case is briefly discussed later.
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w to oﬀer depends on its conjecture about α(w; ..), denoted αˆ(w; ..). The following is
assumed about αˆ(w; ..): firms expect that a worker with belief bˆ after educating chooses
the maximal element of {w, bˆπH−m, πN}. For example, if a worker has the choice between
w = 3, bˆπH − m = 2, and πN = 1, the firm believes that the worker would choose a
credential contract, since w is the maximal element.15 Together with firms’ knowledge
of the distribution of beliefs (recall that firms know the distribution function of X), that
criterion determines αˆ(w; ..), and hence w. The equilibrium definition ensures that there
are unique equilibria in the model.16
It is convenient to divide the workers into three diﬀerent categories, according to their
sorting choice at time 2: those that educate (labeled E), those that choose the N sector
and skip education (labeled N), and those that skip education and choose the S sector
(labeled S). Equilibria where all three groups are present will be denoted fully separating
equilibria, and will be our main focus.
It will be helpful to clarify whether fully separating equilibria can be ’unconnected’,
in the sense of a group being split into two or more disjoint parts on the unit interval. For
example, the sorting {N,S,E}, where those with the lowest confidence level choose the N
sector without educating, those with an intermediate confidence level choose the S sector
(and a performance wage) without educating, and finally those with the highest confidence
educate, is connected. In contrast, the sorting {N,E,S,E} is not connected, since the E
group is split into two disjoint parts (both those with low intermediate confidence and
those with the highest confidence educate). The following remark, which is proven using
individual workers’ payoﬀ only, excludes non-connected equilibria.
15Both in a signaling equilibrium (where w > πN ), and in a non-signaling equilibrium (where w < πN ),
this requirement governs the oﬀ-equilibrium path beliefs of firms (in addition to the on-equilibrium path
beliefs). The requirement is similar in the spirit to the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps, but not
identical since w is endogenous. See Avery and Chevalier (1999) for a similar refinement.
16Assuming that there exist equilibria, I have not put enough structure on the distribution of beliefs to
exclude more than one fixed point to the equation w = α(w; ..) [with w > πN ], so potentially there can
exist several signaling equilibria. The only candidate signaling equilibrium, however, is the fixed point
where the α(w; ..) line crosses the 45 degree line, with the highest value of w. Why? Suppose there are
two fixed points, w1 and w2, where w1 < w2, and that w1 is an equilibrium wage level. But then a firm
can oﬀer a w in between w1 and w2, and make a profit. Thus, if a signaling equilibrium exists, it is
unique. This argument also ensures that there cannot exist a signaling and a non-signaling equilibrium
simultaneously. In the case where a signaling equilibrium does not exist (i.e., there are no fixed points
with w > πN), it is trivial, and hence omitted, to see that there exist a unique equilibrium.
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Remark 2.1 (i) Fully separating equilibria are of two possible types, {N,E,S} and {N,S,E}.
(ii) In a {N,S,E} equilibrium, the motive behind educating is purely signaling.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Part (i) of the remark establishes the convenient fact that only connected sortings
as {N,E,S} and {N,S,E} are consistent with fully separating equilibria. Part (ii) of the
remark shows that in a {N,S,E} equilibrium, the motive behind educating is necessarily
(purely) signaling. Intuitively, since those with confidence level close to 1 are pretty sure
that they are the high type, their motive for educating cannot possibly be information
acquisition, and hence must be signaling. Somewhat surprisingly, the converse result,
that the sorting {N,E,S} implies an information acquisition motive for educating is false,
as shown later.
Now to the question of whether under- and overconfidence at the individual level
cancels out at the aggregate level, given that agents initially have a common prior.17
Consider the following calibration condition for a distribution of beliefs, denoted condition
(C).
Definition 2.1 Condition (C). A distribution of beliefs is calibrated if the fraction of
agents with belief b that are high, equals b, for all b ∈ [0, 1].
For example, for a calibrated distribution of beliefs, the share of workers with belief
3
4
that are in fact high equals
3
4
.18 The following lemma shows that beliefs will indeed be
calibrated in the sense of (C).
Lemma 1 With probability 1, the distribution of beliefs satisfies (C) at time 2 and at
time 3.
Proof. See Appendix A.
17Motivated by findings of overconfidence from Camerer & Lovallo (1999), Hvide (2001) discusses the
case when learning about own abilities does not follow Bayesian principles.
18Let me state condition (C) formally. Let H(b) compute the frequency of high agents with belief b,
and let L(b) compute the frequency of low agents with belief b. Then (C) states that,
θH(b)
θL(b) + (1− θ)L(b) = b, ∀b ∈ (0, 1).
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The lemma says that although individual workers may be under- or overconfident,
it follows from Bayesian learning that self-beliefs are calibrated at population level.19
Lemma 1 follows from common priors and straightforward assumptions on the information
acquisition prior to educating. In appendix A, the robustness of Lemma 1 is discussed.
Notice that by condition (C), those with low confidence are on average of low ability, those
with intermediate confidence are on average mediocre, and those with high confidence are
on average of high ability. Therefore, we will interchangeably refer to those with b close
to zero (one), as having low (high) confidence level and having low (high) ability level in
the following.20
3 Equilibrium Sorting
We start out by considering equilibria where the role of education is information acquisi-
tion, and then consider signaling equilibria.
3.1 Information Acquisition Equilibria
We now consider equilibria where the motive behind education is information acquisition.
Definition 3.1 An information acquisition equilibrium (IAE) is a fully separating equi-
librium where the role of education is information acquisition.
The definition of an IAE does not distinguish between the public and the private
information case. Where necessary, we label an IAE under public information for a public
information IAE, and an IAE under private information for a private information IAE.
Uniqueness of an IAE follows directly from the derivation of individual payoﬀs in Appendix
B. We now solve for the equilibrium sorting in an IAE.
19Lemma 1 has some interest in its own right. First, an interesting task could be to compare Lemma 1
to findings of overconfidence in real life data (Asubel, 1991), and in experimental settings (Camerer and
Lovallo, 1999). Second, Lemma 1 seems useful in (yet undeveloped) multi-agent career concerns models,
and moreover fits well into the framework of Benabou & Tirole (2000a,b).
20In a model with 3 productivity types, a belief of a worker would be a point in a simplex with 3 vertices,
each of length unity. Intermediate confidence in such a generalized model can be understood to have a
belief near the middle of the simplex. Such a person would be of intermediate ability in expected terms,
provided that the diﬀerence between each adjoined type is not great. This argument can be generalized
to the k-type case.
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Proposition 1 In an IAE, the sorting of workers is {N,E,S}. In a private information
IAE, the S group are employed on performance wages, while in a public information IAE,
the S group are employed on fixed wage contracts.
Proof. We start out with the second claim. First, contracts in the S sector under
private information must be of the performance type (with monitoring), because of the
adverse selection that occurs without monitoring. Under public, symmetric, information,
it follows from competition arguments that, in equilibrium, firms oﬀer the worker the fixed
wage b˜πH (with no monitoring cost involved), where b˜ is the common belief about the
worker’s ability. A performance contract, on the other hand, gives the worker the utility
b˜ πH −m. Since m > 0, all workers reject performance contracts, and hence only fixed
wage contracts occur in a public information equilibrium. Now the first claim. Provided
w < πN , which is necessarily the case in an IAE, from Remark 2.1 it follows that the
sorting must be {N,E,S} in a private information IAE. From a similar argument the same
conclusion follows for the public information case follows. The conditions for w < πN will
be considered further down, under existence.
Thus if the motive behind education is information acquisition, the least able (in
expected terms) choose the N sector, the mediocre educate, and the most able choose the
S sector in a fully separating equilibrium. The intuition behind the result is that those
at the extremes have a lower value of information than those in the middle, and hence if
any workers educate, those in the middle must be included in that group.
A private information IAE and a public information IAE both have the sorting {N,E,S},
but equilibrium contracts are diﬀerent in the two cases because of the presence of monitor-
ing under private information. A natural question is whether the diﬀerence in contracts
under public and private information implies diﬀerent sortings under these two informa-
tional assumptions (holding the parameter values constant).
Proposition 2 i)When m = 0, the allocation of workers in the private information IAE
and the public information IAE are identical. ii)The private information IAE has more
able students the higher m.
Proof. See Appendix B.
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Recall that the utility of a fixed wage contract for a worker with confidence level b¯,
equals b¯πH , under public information, while it equals b¯ πH−m under private information.
When m approaches zero, the two values converge (the same convergence can be seen
for the utility from educating), and the allocations of workers must also converge. The
intuition for why students are more able in the private information IAE the higher m is
the following. A private information IAE has two cutoﬀ beliefs; the cutoﬀ between N and
E (denoted b1), and the cutoﬀ between E and S (denoted b2). An increase in m reduces
the payoﬀ from educating (since a performance contract becomes less attractive later on),
while the payoﬀ from choosing the unskilled sector directly is not aﬀected. Hence the
cutoﬀ b1, which separates the N and the E group, increases with m. On the other hand,
an increased m decreases the payoﬀ from a performance contract directly, even more than
it decreases the payoﬀ from educating. Hence both cutoﬀs b1 and b2 are increasing in m,
and it follows that the (average) ability of the educated group in the private information
IAE increases with m.
Two questions are under which circumstances an IAE is produced, and whether an
IAE is more likely to occur under private than under public information.
Remark 3.1 An IAE exists provided cL not too low, cH not too high, m not too high,
and p suﬃciently high. Furthermore, for identical parameter values, the conditions for
existence of an IAE are more restrictive under private than under public information.
Proof. Start out by considering the private information case, and for the moment
assume w < πN . An IAE is then characterized by a)UN , U IAE and US lines intersecting in
an appropriate way, and b)w < πN . For a), we have the following five conditions, which
together are suﬃcient; (i)US(1) > U IAE (1), (ii)US(0) < U
IA
E (0), (iii)US(1) > UN (1), (iv)
U IAE (0) < UN (0), and (v)The intersection between US(b) and U
IA
E (b) must occur above
the UN (b) line. As can easily be seen, (iv) is always satisfied, (iii) implies (i), and (v)
is satisfied for πN not too high and p not too low (if either of these do not hold, then
education is dominated by either N or S). Hence, given πN not too high and p not too low,
there are only two conditions required for a) to be satisfied. From (ii)US(0) < U IAE (0), we
get, cL+
1− p
p
cH <
m+ πN
p
, i.e., cH and cL not too high. And (iii)US(1) > UN (1) implies
m < πH − πN , i.e., m suﬃciently small. For b) to hold, any firm deviating with oﬀering
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w0 > πN must run a deficit. Obviously, any sensible deviation must have w0 ∈ [πN , πH).
It is now showed that for m suﬃciently small and p suﬃciently high, a simple unraveling
argument ensures that there cannot exist a gaining deviation. Ex-post of education, a
worker chooses a performance contract rather than a credential contract if bˆπH −m > w0,
where bˆ is the worker’s ex-post belief. A firm oﬀering w0 will thus attract all workers with
bˆ ≤ w
0
πH −m . When p is high, each educated worker has an ex-post belief bˆ either close
to 0 (those that received bad news), or bˆ close to 1 (those that received good news). For
m suﬃciently low, then those that received good news will prefer a performance contract
rather to a credential contract, and only those that received bad news choose a credential
contract. But, since p is high, the productivity of the agents that received bad news is
close to zero in the S sector. Consequently, for p high and m low, the deviating firm will
run a deficit, and together with a), we then have obtained conditions for existence of a
private information IAE, which together are suﬃcient.
Now consider the public information case, and start out by assuming w < πN . In
that case, the conditions for existence of an IAE are exactly the same as i)-v) above,
except that m = 0, since fixed wage contracts are applied. Hence condition iii) always
holds under public information. That makes an IAE more likely to exist under public
information than under private information. It is now shown that w < πN always holds
under public information, which pulls in the same direction. Firms believe that by setting
w > πN , they will only attract workers with expected productivity lower than w, i.e.,
bˆ πH < w, since workers with expected productivity higher than w will choose a fixed
wage contract (since m = 0 under such contracts). Hence firms oﬀering w > πN will
run a negative profit, and such credential contracts will not be oﬀered (i.e., w < πN in
equilibrium). In other words, there will never be credential contracts in equilibrium under
public information.
Under private information, the important conditions for an IAE to exist is that p is
suﬃciently high and m suﬃciently low, in which case unraveling excludes the existence
of a signaling equilibrium. Since m is irrelevant under public information, and moreover
signaling excluded, the conditions for existence of an IAE are less restrictive under public
than under private information.
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The results obtained so far points out that education can come about in equilibrium
even if it does not alter a worker’s human capital stock, and even if education is not
signaling. The role of education is acquiring information capital that does not alter the
productivity in a given job, but does increase the probability of a successful match with
the right job later on.
To illustrate the content of the previous results, consider the following example of
information acquisition equilibria with private information and varying m.
Example 1 For simplicity assume that p = 1. We then have the following payoﬀs at
time 2, where UN(b) refers to the payoﬀ from choosing N, US(b) refers to the payoﬀ from
choosing the S sector directly, and U IAE (b) refers to the payoﬀ from educating.
UN(b) = πN
US(b) = bπH −m
U IAE (b) = πN − cL + b(πH − πN + cL − cH) (1)
Define the cutoﬀ between N and E as b1, and the cutoﬀ between E and S as b2. Then, as
can be easily calculated,
b1 =
cL
πH −m− πN + cL − cH
b2 =
cL − πN −m
cL − πN −m− cH (2)
Furthermore, define πH = 3, πN = 2, cL = 1, cH = 1/3, to obtain the cutoﬀs as a function
of m alone. As explained before, by the continuum of workers assumption, these cutoﬀs
uniquely define the allocation of workers.
b1 =
3
5− 3m
b2 =
3(1 +m)
4 + 3m
(3)
For m = 0, the public and the private information cutoﬀs coincide and equal bm=01 = .6,
bm=02 = .75. Both b1 and b2 are increasing in m, and hence the average quality of the
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educated group increases in m. These two points confirm Proposition 2. The condition
b1 < b2, which is necessary for existence, is satisfied for m . .43. For a private infor-
mation IAE to exist we also must have that no firm can profitably deviate by oﬀering a
credential contract. Clearly, if a credential contract oﬀer only attracts those who received a
negative signal (and hence are low ability since p = 1) then that deviation runs a negative
profit. Hence a gaining deviation must have,
w > US(1) = 3−m (4)
However, such a deviation cannot be profitable, because the average productivity of the
educated group must fall short of the wage oﬀer, unless m & .49. Hence an IAE exists for
m . .43. That confirms Remark 3.1.
Since the model has formal similarities to the Spence education model, it should not
be surprising that signaling equilibria can also exist under private information. These are
considered in the next section.
3.2 Signaling Equilibria
This section considers signaling equilibria.
Definition 3.2 A signaling equilibrium is an equilibrium where the motive behind educa-
tion is not information acquisition.
While education in the Spence (1973) model always is socially harmful, Spence (1974)
considers a two-sector signaling model where signaling/education has a social role in
allocating talent. As in Spence (1973), signaling equilibria in Spence (1974) have the
property that the most able educate, and are allocated to the sector with the highest
return to talent. There are two main diﬀerences between Spence (1974) and the present
model. First, we have workers with imperfect information about their own abilities,
and second in our model performance contracts is an alternative sorting mechanism to
schooling. The diﬀerences in informational assumptions in our model and in Spence (1974)
can most easily be compared by assuming private information and excluding performance
contracts, by letting m tend to infinity.
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Remark 3.2 Provided m = ∞, separating equilibria must have the sorting {N,E} and
the role of education must be signaling.
Proof. Since performance contracts are not used, there is no point in gaining infor-
mation about one’s type. Therefore signaling must the motive for education. Obviously
those at the bottom cannot educate in a signaling equilibrium, and hence the sorting must
be {N,E} in a separating equilibrium.
Hence the result from the present model, with m high, is that the workers on the top
choose to educate, which is in line with Spence (1974). The next question is which impact
the presence of performance contracts has on the sorting of signaling equilibria. Is the
sorting of signaling equilibria confined to {N,S,E}, in the spirit of Spence, but contrary to
the sorting in IAE? The following comment to Spence points out that even in signaling
equilibria, the sorting can be {N,E,S} provided that performance contracts are feasible.
Proposition 3 For finite m, there exists two types of fully separating signaling equilibria.
One type has the sorting {N,S,E) and the other type has the sorting {N,E,S}.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Hence both the sorting {N,S,E} and the sorting {N,E,S} are consistent with signaling
equilibrium. A {N,S,E} signaling equilibrium occurs when cL is high compared to cH ,
so that it is costly for those in the middle to imitate those at the top. For a {N,E,S}
signaling equilibrium, on the other hand, the intuition is that cL is in an intermediate
range compared to cH , so that those at the top choose S, to avoid being imitated by those
in the middle.
Notice that the condition w > πN does not guarantee that a signaling equilibrium is
played, since it does not exclude that some agents have ’mixed’ motives behind educating.
Mixed motives equilibria are characterized by agents with a positive signal from education
taking a performance wage in the S sector, and those with a negative signal taking a
credential contract. Such equilibria are hard to characterize but may have some empirical
plausibility; those that educate work in the same sector, but on diﬀerent payment schemes.
Those who do best in school choose jobs with relatively high-powered incentives, and those
that are second in school choose jobs with relatively low-powered incentives.
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A persistent finding from the equilibrium analysis is that the mediocre educate, while
the most able skip education. Since established theories of education (see e.g., Borjas,
1996), predict that the most able educate, we should discuss that issue. Is the real world
characterized by those in the middle educating, rather than those at the top? For several
professions, like Medicine, education serves as a license, and individuals without a license
are denied work. Here, there is no reason to believe that the prediction of the model
should hold. In an area like business, however, a degree is not required. It is interesting
to note that there do exist some evidence (admittedly rather casual) that some of the most
able within business skip education. For example, Orzach and Tauman (1999) argue that
surprisingly many on the 1996 Forbes 400 list, the 400 richest people in the US, do not have
an academic degree (Bill Gates is a well-known example).21 Another interesting finding
is that regularly, MBA students from top schools drop out to work in new economy firms,
like internet start-up companies.22 This finding seems consistent with the best choosing
a direct way of entering the job market, rather than educating first, as the basic model
predicts.23
In Appendix C, we consider some welfare properties of the model. We now make the
model more realistic by letting education have a direct productivity augmenting eﬀect, in
addition to the information acquisition eﬀect.
21Orzach and Tauman (1999) argue that this finding is consistent with equilibrium in a signaling model
where students have the option to quit school after a short period of study. Feltovich, Harbaugh and
To (1999) also argue that the mediocre invest in schooling to sort themselves from the least able, while
the most able skip school (like Gates did). To construct such separating equilibria, Orzach and Tauman
(1999) assume that ordinary individuals learn at an exceptional rate at the basic education level, and
Feltovich, Harbaugh and To (1999) assume that firms know other individual-specific characteristics than
education level.
22According to the Exec-Express Magazine issue of August 2000, top MBA programs as London Busi-
ness School have experienced a substantial drop-out to internet start-up companies (it is also well-known
that Stanford University has experienced substantial drop-out rates to the high-tech industry). As a
compromise, some business schools allow MBA students to gain work experience in companies like
Garage.com, which has a summer intern program designed to provide first year MBA students with
experience of working in start-ups.
23Another practical example of the basic model is the entry draft for the National Basketball Associa-
tion. High school players have the choice to enter the draft for the professional league directly or to enter
college. In college, those players gain skills, but also learn more about their own abilities.
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4 Extensions and Applications
We have emphasized that education and monitoring can play the role of producing in-
formation, but have ignored the fact that they can also increase productivity directly,
through human capital growth and incentives. In this section, we consider the case when
education implies an increase in general human capital, and moreover discuss the case
when worker productivity is determined by eﬀort in addition to type.
4.1 Productivity augmenting eﬀect of education
We model general human capital acquisition by assuming that education increases pro-
ductivity by a factor h>1 in each job. Specifically, an educated low ability worker has
productivities (hπN ,hπL)=(hπN ,0), in the N and S job respectively, and an educated high
worker person has productivities (hπN ,hπH), in the N and S job respectively.24 The pro-
ductivities of an uneducated worker is the same as before. We focus on the structure
of IAE when education also adds to general human capital, and assume throughout the
section that information is public.
Proposition 4 i)For h suﬃciently close to 1, a fully separating equilibrium has the sort-
ing {N,E,S}. ii)For larger h, the sorting must be {N,S,E}.
Proof. The first, robustness, claim follows along the lines of the proof of Remark 2.1
and is skipped for brevity. For ii), observe that UN and US are unaﬀected by h, while UE
is the same as in equation (1), except that πN is replaced by hπN and πH is replaced by
hπH . Hence there must exist a value of h, denoted hˆ, such that for h > hˆ those at the
top choose to educate.
While the first part of the claim follows from standard robustness arguments, the
second claim provides some qualitatively new insight. The intuition for the result is that
for h suﬃciently high, those at the top will realize a high absolute productivity increase
from educating. To provide an example of an {N,S,E} equilibrium, consider the following
parameter values.
24Other specifications of human capital acquisition, like an additive formulation, produces qualitatively
the same type of results.
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Example 2 Let πH=3, πN=1, cL=2, cH=1, p=1, and h=32 . As can easily be calculated,
a fully separating equilibrium is characterized by the sorting {N,S,E}, with cutoﬀs 1
3
and 1
2
.
Those in the middle will face a lesser productivity increase (and a higher cost of education)
than those at the top, and will prefer to enter the S sector directly, without educating first.
4.2 Comparison of Bachelor’s degrees
It may be the case that some types of education primarily have a productivity augmenting
eﬀect, while other types of education have an informational eﬀect. For example, a large
part of a US Bachelor’s degree will typically consist of a mixture of courses across fields,
which can be as distant as chemistry and philosophy. The specialization that occurs
will consist of general knowledge within a field and will not necessarily make the student
much more productive in any given job. However, the experimentation allowed the student
will give her important information about which field she should later specialize in. In
contrast, the UK Bachelor’s degree is typically rather specialized, covering the same field
for at least three years, and allowing some true specialization that will make the student
more productive in given jobs. However, due to the specialization, the UK Bachelor’s
degree will not provide students with the same information about diﬀerent fields as the
corresponding US degree.
So the point is that the UK system will make students more productive than the
US system, holding the job constant. However, the US system enable students to make
better informed choices of which sector they should work in.25 Depending on the relative
magnitude of the two learning eﬀects, one system may dominate the other system, given
that they educate workers to the same type of society. One reason why diﬀerent systems
are preferred in the two countries can be that moving costs are lower in the US than in
the UK (both sectorwise and geographically), so that information about abilities is more
valuable for a person living in the US than for a person living in the UK.
In several European countries, the education system is a hybrid of the US and the UK
system, meaning that special and general educations coexist at the undergraduate level.
25We are ignoring other diﬀerences between the two systems, for example that the UK undergraduate
education usually lasts for 3 years, while the US undergraduate education usually lasts for 4 years.
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For example, in Norway both general and specific undergraduate degrees are available.
The general degree (Cand. Mag.) is similar to the US Bachelor’s degree, and the specific
degrees are similar to the UK Bachelor’s degree.
By extending the model, we can ask whether the general or the specific education
tend to recruit the most able. We label by EA the education which primarily leads to
information acquisition, and by EB the education that primarily leads to a productivity
increase.26 For simplicity it is assumed that EA is perfectly revealing about type, i.e., that
pA=1 and that EA does not have a productivity increasing eﬀect, i.e., hA=1. For EB, it is
assumed that pB = 1
2
and that hB, simply written h, is greater than unity. We then have
the following result.
Proposition 5 In a fully separating equilibrium, the sorting is {N,EA, S, EB}.
Proof. We have the following payoﬀs.
UN (b) = πN
US(b) = bπH
UAE (b) = b[πH − cH ] + (1− b)[πN − cL] = πN − cL + b(πH − πN + cL − cH)
UBE (b) = hπN − c¯ for b < b˜ and hbπH − c¯ for b ≥ b˜. (5)
where b˜ :=
πN
πH
, i.e., the belief that makes a worker indiﬀerent between N and S, and
c¯ =
cL + cH
2
. i) observe that ∂U
B
E
∂b
= hπH >
∂US
∂b
= πH for b ∈ [˜b, 1]. Hence for a fully
separating equilibrium to exist, those with the highest belief must prefer EB to S. ii)
observe that UAE (1) = πH − cH < US(1) = πH . Hence S must dominate EA for those
with the highest beliefs. From i) and ii) it follows that the sorting at the top must be
{EA,S,EB} for a fully separating equilibrium to exist. By the same argument as before, N
must be preferred by those with lowest beliefs to be preferred by anyone, which occurs for c˜
suﬃciently high. Hence the sorting in a fully separating equilibrium must be {N,EA,S,EB}.
26Diﬀerent degrees are characterized by diﬀerent degrees of rationing, which may reflect underlying
diﬀerences in the cost for the educational institution of providing a degree. We abstract from such issues
here.
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The intuition for the result is that although the percentage productivity increase from
h is uniform across agents, the absolute productivity increase is higher for those with
high beliefs than for those with low beliefs. That leads the more able to prefer the B
education rather than the A education. And, as before, the value of information is higher
for those in the middle than those at the top. That leads those in the middle to prefer
the A education to the B education. The intuition for why the sorting must be {N,EA,S}
below the EB group, i.e., that S group consists of more able workers than EA, is the same
as before.27
It is interesting to notice that Proposition 6 is consistent with empirical evidence. In
e.g., Norway, the most able (measured by high school grades) tend to be recruited to the
professional educations (MD, BBA, BScient, and to a certain extent Law, Psychology
and Economics), similar to the UK bachelor degrees, while the (on average) less able
tend to undertake general university educations that are quite similar to the US bachelor
degrees.28
4.3 Other issues
We now discuss the impact on the results to changes in the assumptions of the model.
We have only considered the polar cases where either all information received is private
or where it is public. Let us consider intermediate cases. First the eﬀect of letting the
information prior to education be private, while the information during education be
public would create two classes of educated, those with low grades and those with high
grades. For information acquisition equilibria, this distinction would not be important,
since both groups are oﬀered the same type of contracts. There would, however, exist more
sophisticated signaling equilibria than before, where workers with low (high) grades receive
a low (high) credential wage. Since workers with lower (higher) beliefs are less (more) likely
to receive high grades, such a distinction would tend to make those with lower (higher)
beliefs less (more) motivated to educate, but would not have much additional impact.
27The model does not take into account that diﬀerent educations tend to recruit students to diﬀerent
occupations, or sectors. As long as those sectors do not have very diﬀerent underlying returns to ability,
such an extension would not to alter the results in any significant way.
28It should be mentioned that the author holds a general university degree from Norway.
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Second, letting the information prior to education be public, while the information during
education be private, would destroy the possibility of signaling equilibria, since such
equilibria relies on information that is private before education. In that case, IAE would
be the only possible type of equilibrium.
The introduction of risk aversion would make the A education more attractive com-
pared to B education and to S, because this option reduces risk. But for risk preferences
without strong wealth-eﬀects, the group of agents undertaking the A education would still
be those in the middle, since their insurance motive would be the strongest. A negative
wealth-eﬀect on risk could lead those at the top to also have a strong insurance motive,
and it is conceivable that the group of agents undertaking the A education would be
unconnected (but in any case those at the very top would not choose A education).
We have only considered adverse selection eﬀects - there has been no notion of workers
choosing their level of eﬀort once employed. If workers choose their level of eﬀort, and
eﬀort is observable, contracts can be conditioned on the appropriate level of eﬀort being
expended, and the same type of results as before would follow.29 If eﬀort is unobservable,
appropriate forcing contracts can be defined to implement the first best level of eﬀort, as
long as workers are risk neutral, and again the same type of results would follow. If eﬀort
is unobservable and workers are risk averse, second-best performance contracts, trading
oﬀ risk and incentive eﬀects, would be constructed. Those performance contracts would
be less high-powered incentives than those in the present model, due to risk concerns.
However, provided that risk aversion is not severe, we expect IAE in such an extended
model to have qualitatively very similar properties to the IAE studied presently, since
performance contracts are already used in such equilibria. For signaling equilibria, how-
ever, the introduction of eﬀort and risk aversion would make the equilibrium credential
contracts include performance elements, to induce eﬀort. A simple linear contract could
be one way for a firm to ensure that the worker both expends eﬀort (through the bonus
component) and would wish to sign for the firm (through the salary component). At any
rate, we expect sorting to be very similar in such an extended model.
29Prendergast (2000) argues that contracts that conditions on input rather than output are both
common in practice, and models that builds on such contracting can explain important facts not captured
by the standard risk-return incentive model.
23
5 Conclusion
While the received education literature tends to focus on the accumulation of human cap-
ital through education and the implied dispersion of wages, we extend the literature by
focusing on how education serves to allocate talent into diﬀerent sectors of the economy.
In particular, we focused on a two-sector setting where contracts are determined endoge-
nously, and where education provides workers with information about their abilities. In
contrast to established theories of education, the basic model obtained the result that
those with intermediate ability educate, while those at the top skip education.
When the model was made more realistic, by including a direct productivity augment-
ing eﬀect of education, this conclusion could be reversed, provided that the productivity
augmenting eﬀect is suﬃciently strong. More interestingly, the extension could be applied
to discuss the properties of diﬀerent educational systems. For example, it was shown that
in a system where general and specific educations co-exist, the most able will tend to un-
dertake the specific education, while those in the middle will undertake general education,
a finding that is consistent with empirical facts.
One extension of the present model could be to build a dynamic setting where agents
can learn about their abilities through work experience, in addition to through educating.
A realistic feature of such a model could be to include a cost of switching sectors (such a
cost could be monetary as well as non-monetary). Included in the returns to education for
an individual would then be a reduced switching cost later in the career. Since empirical
studies on the returns to education typically take into account increases in wages from
education, but not the benefit of a reduced switching costs, this argument suggests that
the estimated returns to education found in empirical studies are biased downwards, due
to the ignored allocation eﬀect of education.
Another extension of the present work is to attempt to better understand the func-
tioning of the education market when several educations co-exist. For example, while the
present model assumes that the cost of education is essentially constant across educations,
the cost of education, including tuition fees, could more realistically be seen as emerging
from competition between diﬀerent education institutions.
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6 Appendix A: The Relation Between Common Pri-
ors and Condition (C)
It is proven that the distribution of beliefs satisfies condition (C) at time 2 and at time
3, with probability 1. Since it is trivial to see that condition (C) is satisfied at time 3, if
it is satisfied at time 2, we save space by merely proving that the distribution of beliefs
satisfies (C) at time 2.
At time 0, workers are born with a common prior θ. Between time 0 and the education
decision at time 2, each worker receives independent information about their abilities, and
constructs a pre-education belief b. Formally, the information received by each worker
between time 0 and time 1 is an independent realization of a random variable T , where,
for simplicity, T has the support [0, 1]. If the true ability of a worker is high, then T
follows the density dH(t), while if the worker’s true ability is low then T follows dL(t). To
avoid ’holes’ in the distribution of beliefs at time 1, assume that dL(.) is continuous and
strictly decreasing, and dH(.) is continuous and strictly increasing, with dL(1), dH(0) ≥ 0,
and dL(0) and dH(1) finite. Thus the higher realization of T , the better news for a worker.
Let h(b) be the fraction of agents that are high among those with belief b prior to
education. Thus,
h(b) :=
θH(b)
θL(b) + θH(b)
, b ∈ (0, 1) (A1)
where H(b) is the frequency of high agents that have the belief b, and L(b) is the frequency
of low agents that have the belief b. Notice that since the information received by each
worker is stochastic, H(b) and L(b) are random variables, and hence h(b) is also a random
variable. We wish to prove that,
Lemma 1 With probability 1, h(b) = b at time 2, ∀b ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. From Bayes’ rule it follows that an individual who receives information T = t,
has posterior b(t; θ) =
θdH(t)
θdH(t) + (1− θ)dL(t) . Let N (b) denote the number of individuals
with posterior b,M(b) the number of high agents with posterior b, and them(b) the share
of high agents; m(b) = M (b)
N (b)
. Since Pr(H |b) = b, it follows that M is a random variable,
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binomially distributed with parameters b and N , with E(M) = bN , and V ar(M) =
Nb(1 − b). It follows that E(m|b,N) = b, and V ar(m|b,N) = b(1− b)
N
. Since
b(1− b)
N
converges to zero as N increases, the probability of m(b) ∈ (b − ², b+ ²) converges to 1
as N becomes large, for any ² > 0. Since there is a continuum of agents at the outset,
continuity and monotonicity of dL(.) and dH(.) ensures that there will be a continuum of
agents for each posterior b ∈ (0, 1); hence N(b) goes to infinity. Thus condition (C) holds
with probability 1 at time 2.
Lemma 1 shows that starting with a common prior, and assuming that each individual
receives a private and independent signal about his ability, the distribution of beliefs prior
to education will satisfy condition (C) with probability 1.
Lemma 1 will hold also in the case where the distributions of the information received
by individual agents are independent, but not identical. [It follows that condition (C)
also will hold at time 3]. Second, the distribution functions need not be independent for
Lemma 1 to hold. By a slightly more elaborate argument it can be shown that Lemma
1 holds even if the information received by workers is (imperfectly) correlated, or if the
information received by some agents is correlated, and by others not. Third, obviously
a continuum of workers is needed to get convergence with probability 1. With a finite,
but large, number of workers, the distribution of beliefs will be ’close’ to (C) with a high
probability. Thus Lemma 1 is fairly robust.
7 Appendix B: Proofs
Expected utility for the three possible actions at time 2:
As explained in the text, the payoﬀ from choosing the N sector directly and choosing
a performance contract in the S sector directly equals,
UN(b) : = πN
US(b) : = bπH −m (B0)
Denote the value of b where a worker is indiﬀerent between these options for b0. Hence,
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b0 =
πN +m
πH
. Now the utility from educating. The cost of education, c(b), equals,
c(b) = Prob(X = cH |b)cH + Prob(X = cL|b)cL
= [bp + (1− p)(1− b)]cH + [b(1− p) + (1− b)p]cL
= [cH − cHp + pcL]− b[2p− 1][cL − cH ] (B1)
which is linearly decreasing in b. For w < πN , the utility from educating can be split
into three intervals, depending on the value of b. The first (third) interval consists of the
values of b where N (S) is the optimal choice independently of the realization of X . The
second interval consists of the values of b where the optimal choice of sector depends on
the realization of X ; N if the realization is cL and S if the realization is cH . Denote the
boundaries of this interval for bL and bH , where bL < bH . Then,
U IAE (b) : = Pr(X = cH |b)[Pr(H|X = cH , b)πH −m] +
[1− Pr(X = cH |b)]πN − c(b), b ∈ [bL, bH ]. (B2)
where topscript IA stands for information acquisition. Rewriting this expression and
adding the utilities oﬀ the interval [bL, bH ], we get,
U IAE (b) =

πN − c(b) if b < bL
[bp+ (1− p)(1− b)][−m− cH ]+
bpπH + (b(1− p) + (1− b)p)(πN − cL)
if b ∈ [bL, bH ]
bπH −m− c(b) if b > bH
(B3)
First notice that U IAE (b) is piecewise linear. Since U
IA
E (b) consequently is the upper
envelope of three linear components, U IAE (b) is convex. Second, as can be verified,
bL =
b0(1− p)
b0 + p− 2b0p and bH =
b0p
1− p− b0 + 2b0p . Notice that oﬀ [bL, bH ] education, and
hence further down in the proof we just use the expression in (B2). When p equals 1,
bL equals 0, bH equals 1, and U IAE (b) becomes linear and equal to the expression in the
second line of (B3) inserted for p = 1, which equals the expression in equation (1).
When w > πN , education can be both signaling (choose w independently of the value
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of X) and information acquisition (choose w if news are negative, and a performance
contract if news are positive), and we label the corresponding utility for UME (b), where M
stands for mixed motives. The expression for UME (b) is identical to U
IA
E (b), except that
πN is replaced by w, and is not reproduced. By the same argument as with U IAE (b), it
can be seen that UME (b) is convex.
The pure signaling motive behind education is a special case of the mixed motives
behind education, and occurs if w is preferred to a performance contract in the S sector
independently of b. The expected utility for a pure signaling motive then equals,
USE(b) = w − c(b) (B4)
where topscript S stands for signaling. Notice that for all b, UME (b) ≥ USE(b) by construc-
tion.
Proof. of Remark 2.1.
We first show that fully separating equilibria must be connected, and then prove i)
and ii). Notice first that the utility from education, labeled UE(b) (which encompasses
both cases w < πN and w > πN ) is increasing in b. Since UN(b) is a constant, and both
US(b) and UE(b) are increasing in b, UN (b) cannot cross UE(b) or US(b) more than once.
To establish the claim, it is hence suﬃcient to show that UE(b) and US(b) can cross at
most once. Consider first the case when w < πN , which implies that the motive behind
education must be information acquisition. There are two cases, a)U IAE (1) > US(1) and
b)U IAE (1) < US(1). Case a) can only occur if πN > πH −m, in which case UN (b) > US(b)
for all b, and a fully separating equilibrium cannot exist. Now consider b)U IAE (1) < US(1).
But then, from the convexity of U IAE (b), the lines U
IA
E (b) and US(b) can cross only once
and connectedness follows. For the case w > πN the argument is analogous. Again
there are two cases, a)UME (1) > US(1) and b)U
M
E (1) < US(1). Case a) can only occur if
w > πH −m, in which case UME (b) = USE(b). USE(b) is linear, implying that also UME (b) is
linear under a), and connectedness follows immediately. Now consider b)UME (1) < US(1).
But then, from the convexity of UME (b), the lines U
M
E (b) and US(b) can cross only once
and connectedness follows. Hence fully separating equilibria must be connected. Since
U IAE (b), U
M
E (b), and US(b) are upward-sloping and UN(b) a constant, it follows that i)fully
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separating equilibria must be of the type {N,E,S} or the type {N,S,E}. To prove ii),
observe that workers with b = 1 have a zero value of information, and hence their motive
behind education must be signaling. If signaling is the motive behind education for those
with b = 1, it must also be the motive behind education for those with a lower b, by a
simple revealed preference argument. Hence signaling is necessarily the motive behind
education in an {N,S,E} equilibrium.
Proof. of Proposition 2.
Let b1 denote the cutoﬀ between N and E, and b2 denote the cutoﬀ between E and
S in an IAE. The proof proceeds to show that for m = 0, then b1 and b2 are equal to
the corresponding cutoﬀs under public information. Moreover, we show that both b1 and
b2 are monotonically increasing in m. Solving for b1 and b2 (from the expressions of the
payoﬀs at the beginning of this appendix, using the relevant expression for U IAE (b), from
(B2)) yields,
b1 : = {b : UN = U IAE (b)} =
(1− p)(cL − πN − cH −m)− cL
Ψ
b2 : = {b : UN = U IAE (b)} =
mp− cH + cHp+ pπN − pcL
Ψ+ πH
(B5)
where Ψ := (2p−1)(πN + cH+m−cL)−pπH . Since bπH−m (the value of a performance
contract under private information) converges to bπH (the value of a fixed wage contract
under public information) when m goes to zero, it is immediate that the allocation of
workers under private information converges to the allocation of workers under public
information, when m approaches zero. Diﬀerentiating the cutoﬀs b1 and b2 with respect
to m yields,
∂b1
∂m
=
(2p− 1)cL + p(1− p)πH
Ψ2
> 0
∂b2
∂m
=
(2p− 1)cH + p(1− p)πH
(Ψ+ πH)2
> 0 (B6)
It follows immediately that the average ability of those educating in a private information
IAE increases with m. Hence the average ability of the educated group is higher under
private information than under public information IAE.
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Proof. of Proposition 3.
We prove existence of an {N,E,S} signaling equilibrium, and then prove the existence
of an {N,S,E} signaling equilibrium. To make the example analytically tractable, assume
throughout that p = 1, θ = 1
2
and that beliefs are uniformly distributed, i.e., f(z) = 1,
∀z ∈ [0, 1]. Then, by Lemma 1, we have that, fL(z) = 2(1− z) and fH(z) = 2z. Denote
the credential wage in an {N, E, S} signaling equilibrium for wmiddle. Provided that an
{N,E,S} signaling equilibrium exists, it is straightforward to see that the credential wage
just equals the average productivity of the educated group, i.e.,
wmiddle = πH
b3 + b4
2
(B7)
where b3 is the cutoﬀ between N and E, and b4 is the cutoﬀ between E and S. For an
{N,E,S} signaling equilibrium to exist, there are three conditions. First, a person with a
high belief at stage 2 must prefer a performance wage to educating, i.e., US(1) > USE(1),
which is equivalent to πH −m > wmiddle − cH . Second, a person that receives good news
when educating (X = cH) must prefer the credential wage to the performance wage.
Hence wmiddle > πH −m. Putting the first and the second condition together, we have
that
πH −m < wmiddle < πH −m+ cH (B8)
The first inequality ensures that a person with a high belief at stage 2 prefers a perfor-
mance wage to educating, and the second inequality ensures that a person with a high
belief after educating prefers the credential wage to the performance wage contract. Third,
to ensure that the equilibrium is fully separating, we must have that,
0 < b3 < b4 < 1 (B9)
Using the expressions for payoﬀs at the beginning of the appendix, we get the following
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system of equations determining b3, b4 and wmiddle,
UN (b3) = πN = U
S
E(b3) = w
middle − b3cH − (1− b3)cL
USE(b4) = w
middle − b4cH − (1− b4)cL = US(b4) = b4πH −m
wmiddle = πH
b3 + b4
2
(B10)
Solving this system yields,
b3 =
2cHπN+2cHcL−2cLπN+πNπH−mπH−2c2L+2cLπH
π2H−2c2H+4cHcL−2c22L
b4 =
πNπH+mπH+2cHcL−2cHm−2c2L+2cLm
π2H−2c2H+4cHcL−2c2L
(B11)
We can now construct numerical examples of an {N,E,S} signaling equilibrium. For
example, let πH = 4, πN = 1, cL = 3/2, cH = 1, m = 2, and insert into (B11) to obtain
b3 ≈ .35, and b4 ≈ .81, and wmiddle = πH b3 + b4
2
≈ 2.32. As can easily be seen, (B8) is
satisfied since, πH −m = 2 < wmiddle = 2.32 < πH −m+ cH = 3.
Now {N,S,E} signaling equilibria. Denote the credential wage in an {N,S,E} signaling
equilibrium for wtop, the cutoﬀ between N and S for b5, and the cutoﬀ between S and E for
b6. Provided that an {N,S,E} signaling equilibrium exists, wtop = πH b6+12 . For an {N,S,E}
signaling equilibrium to exist, there are two conditions, which together are necessary and
suﬃcient. First, USE(1) > US(1), which is equivalent to,
wtop − cH > πH −m (B12)
The second condition is that,
0 < b5 < b6 < 1 (B13)
By simple calculations, we find that b5 =
πN +m
πH
> 0, and b6 =
2m+ πH − 2cL
2cH + πH − 2cL . Since
m > cH , the condition b6 < 1 from (B13) implies that cL >
πH
2
. Finally, for b5 < b6
from (B13), we have that m <
−πNπH + 2πNcH − 2πNcL − π2H + 2πHcL
πH + 2cL − 2cH . Since m > 0,
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this implies that (i) cL large and (ii)πH > 2πNcL >
π2H − πNπH − 2πNcH
2(πH − πN ) > cH [where
the latter inequality implies πH > 2πN ], and moreover that m is on the appropriate
interval, is necessary and suﬃcient for existence. From these conditions it is simple to
construct examples of {N,S,E} signaling equilibria. For instance, let πH = 2, πN = 1,
cL = 4, cH = 0, m = 1/10, to obtain b5 = .55, and b6 = 2930 . (B10) is satisfied because,
wtop − cH = 2915 = 5830 > πH −m = 1910 = 5730 .
8 Appendix C: Welfare
Education has a productive role in the model by improving workers’ information, and
hence their choice of sector. There are two reasons for why education may be at least partly
counter-productive. The first is signaling, with associated information ignorance and free-
riding problems. The other reason is that in information acquisition equilibria, aggregate
cost of monitoring becomes high, because in such equilibria performance contracts are
chosen. It can thus be conceivable that welfare would be higher if workers instead of
educating to acquire information would educate to signal their abilities, and hence choose
credential contracts later on (in which case the aggregate cost of monitoring would be
lower). Hence a counter-productive eﬀect of education may occur because the those who
educate have the wrong motive behind education.30
Define the desirability, or welfare, of an allocation of workers simply as the sum of
production, subtracted the cost of educating and the cost of monitoring.31 To assess
the forces above, suppose that the social planner may prohibit performance contracts, to
induce a signaling equilibrium. Surprisingly, it turns that the planner may wish to do so
under certain conditions, to switch the economy from an IAE to a signaling equilibrium.
It is assumed that the social planner has the same information about workers as firms
do (i.e., θ and the distribution ofX). With a global welfare optimum, it is meant a situation
where government intervention can only harm welfare. With a local welfare optimum, it
is meant a situation where a ’small’ government intervention (not large enough to shift
30By the same argument, possibly welfare could increase if the S group chose to educate to signal.
31Formally, W := Π−M − C, where Π is aggregate production, M is the aggregate monitoring cost,
and C is the aggregate cost of education.
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the economy into a diﬀerent type of equilibrium) can only harm welfare. By construction,
a global welfare optimum is also a local welfare optimum.
Proposition 6 i)A public information IAE is always a global welfare optimum. ii)A
private information IAE is always a local welfare optimum, and for m suﬃciently low it
is also a global welfare optimum. However, iii)For m suﬃciently high, an IAE need not
be a global welfare optimum. iv) A signaling equilibrium is never a local welfare optimum.
Proof. i)When a worker chooses whether to educate, and which sector to work in,
in a public information IAE, the social costs and benefits of the various alternatives are
fully internalized: A social planner knowing that the distribution of beliefs is calibrated
in the sense of (C) has the same valuation to the diﬀerent alternatives for an worker
with belief b as the worker with belief b has himself. Hence a public information IAE is
a global welfare optimum. ii)By the same argument as under i), a private information
IAE is local welfare optimum. If a played IAE is not a global optimum, then a social
planner would prefer an equilibrium where at least some agents are signaling, since an
IAE is a local welfare optimum. We show that provided m < cHp +(1 − p)cL, a social
planner does not wish to switch the economy from an IAE to an equilibrium where some
agents are signaling. First, consider agents in the S group of the played IAE. Recall that
all agents in this group would also choose the S sector if they were to educate and then
choose a credential contract. So in considering whether some of the agents in the S group
should choose to educate and then choose credential contract in the S sector, the social
planner compares the aggregate cost of monitoring in an IAE with the cost of education
in a signaling equilibrium. But, since the cost of education is decreasing in b, and since
m < c(1) = cHp +(1−p)cL, the social planner clearly prefers that all agents in the S group
choose a performance contract rather than undertake education and choose a credential
contract. Now the E group, for completeness. From the same argument, a social planner
prefers all members of this group to choose a performance contract rather than to choose a
credential contract, if they were to choose anything diﬀerent from information acquisition.
So, denoting the welfare generated by the E group forWE , we have in shorthand notation
that WE(S) > WE(Signaling). But, since an IAE is a local optimum, we have that
WE(E) > WE(S). It follows that WE(E) > WE(Signaling), and hence the social surplus
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cannot be increased by constructing an equilibrium where some in the E group uses
education as a signal rather than as information acquisition. To show that a social planner
cannot increase social surplus by constructing an equilibrium where (some of the) agents
in the N group is signaling, follows from the same type of argument, and is omitted.
Finally, it follows from an IAE being a local optimum that a social planner does not wish
to move any of the agents in the E or S group into the N group. Thus we can conclude
that an IAE is a global welfare optimum for m < cHp +(1 − p)cL. iii) To show that an
IAE is not necessarily a global optimum for m > cHp +(1−p)cL, an example of an IAE is
constructed where welfare can be improved by prohibiting individual contracts (and hence
make signaling the motive behind education). The calculation of the example is relegated
to a separate worksheet, which is available from the author. Here a sketch is given. Let
beliefs be distributed uniformly (see the proof of Proposition 1 in this appendix), and let
cH =
1
10
, cL = 2.5, πH = 5, πN = 2, p = 1, and m = 32 . In that case, m =
3
2
> cHp
+(1− p)cL = 110 , so the suﬃcient condition for global optimum is violated. Furthermore,
there exists an IAE b1 ≈ .64 and b2 ≈ .91, with welfare equal to W∗ ≈ 2.26. (In the
worksheet, it is shown that a firm deviating with oﬀering a w0 > πN = 2, would run a
deficit). Now, with the same parameter values, suppose that the social planner prohibits
performance contracts (i.e., sets m = ∞). In that case (calculations are relegated to
the worksheet), there exists a signaling equilibrium where those with belief lower than
(approximately) .41 choose N, and those with belief higher than .41 choose education as
a signal. The welfare level of this signaling equilibrium is Wsignal ≈ 2.42. Thus, in the
constructed IAE, a social planner prohibits performance contracts and increases welfare
from 2.26 to 2.42. iv)Denote the belief of the marginal worker undertaking education in
an {N,E} or in an {N,S,E} signaling equilibrium by b˜. Furthermore, let P (b) denote the
fraction of high type workers among those workers with beliefs on the interval [b, 1]. Then,
P (b) =
θH(1− FH(b))
θH(1− FH(b)) + θL(1− FL(b)) (C1)
where Fi(.) is the cumulative frequency of workers with beliefs b that are in fact of type i.
Notice that the shape of the distribution of beliefs enters P (b) through FL(.) and FH(.)
(where one of them is redundant given (C)). Since wages are set competitively, the wage
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for educated workers in a signaling equilibrium, where those at the top educate equals
P (b˜)πH . As can easily be seen, in an equilibrium where P (b˜) > b˜πH , welfare would be
increased if the marginal workers had skipped education and instead chosen N directly.
To see that P (b˜) > b˜ is indeed the case in a signaling equilibrium, use (C) and insert into
(C1) to obtain,
P (b˜) =
R 1
b˜
fH(z)dzR 1
b˜
1
z
fH(z)dz
(C2)
The rest of the proof of (ii) follows from subtracting b˜ and observing that P (b˜) − b˜ >
0. Thus, due to free-riding, there is too much education in equilibria where those at
the top signal. We now show that there is an ineﬃcient amount of education in an
{N,E,S} signaling equilibrium. An individual chooses a performance contract rather than
education at time 2, if bπH − m ≥ w − c(b). However, maximization of welfare implies
that a worker should choose a performance contract rather than educating if bπH −m ≥
bπH − c(b). Since bπH < w, it follows directly that too few of those with high confidence
educate in {N,E,S} equilibria. From the same argument as above it follows that too many
of those with low confidence choose E in a signaling equilibrium.
The intuition for i) is that under public information, a government intervention will
create distortions in the economy which can only harm the allocation of workers from
a welfare perspective. The intuition for ii) is that under public information, an IAE
is always a global welfare optimum. And since a private information IAE is close to
a public information IAE when m is small, a private information IAE is also a global
welfare optimum for m small, because the aggregate cost of monitoring is small. This
result illustrates that if information acquisition is an important function of education,
then private information does not have the dramatic eﬀect on welfare it has e.g., in the
Spence (1973) model. The intuition for iii), which is more surprising, can be shed in terms
of externalities. In information acquisition equilibria, workers that educate can incur a
negative externality on the workers below them on the confidence scale, because those
workers would prefer the former group to choose a credential contract (and hence signal
rather than acquire information) for them to free-ride on, rather than a performance
contract. Hence, when the social planner prohibits performance contracts, that is a crude
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measure to neutralize this externality.
9 References
Altonji, J. G. and C. R. Pierret (2001). Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination.
Forthcoming, Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Avery, C. and J. Chevalier (1999). Herding over the Career. Economics Letters, 63,
327-33.
Benabou, R. & J. Tirole (2000a). Self-Confidence: Intrapersonal Strategies. Working
paper, Princeton University.
Benabou, R. & J. Tirole (2000b). Self-Confidence and Social Interactions. Working
paper, Princeton University.
Blaug, M. ed. (1992). The Economic Value of Education: Studies in the Economics
of Education. International Library of Critical Writings in Economics. University Press,
Cambridge.
Borjas, G. J. (1996). Labor Economics. McGraw-Hill.
Camerer, C. and D. Lovallo (1999). Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experi-
mental Approach. American Economic Review, 89, 306-318.
Chevalier, J. and G. Ellison (1999). Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 389-432.
Dewatripont, M., I. Jewitt, and J. Tirole (1999a). The Economics of Career Concerns,
Part I: Comparing Information Structures. Review of Economic Studies, 66, 183-198.
Dewatripont, M., I. Jewitt, and J. Tirole (1999b). The Economics of Career Concerns,
Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies. Review of
Economic Studies, 66, 199-217.
Exec-Express Magazine, August 2000. Available at http://www.webfire.co.uk/exec-
express/homepage.htm.
Fama, E. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political
Economy, 88, 288-307.
Feltovich, N., R. Harbaugh and T. To (1999). Too Cool for School? Signaling and
Countersignaling. Available at http://www.uh.edu/~nfelt/papers/counter8.pdf.
36
Fershtman, C., K. Murphy and Y. Weiss (1996). Education, Status and Growth.
Journal of Political Economy, 104, 108-132.
Grossman, G. (1999). Imperfect Contracts and International Trade. Draft, Woodrow
Wilson School of Public Policy and International Trade, Princeton University. Available
at: http://www.wws.princeton.edu:80/~grossman/.
Holmstrom, B. (1982/1999). Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective.
Essays in Economics and Managment in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck (Helsinki: Swedish
School of Economics). Reprinted (with an added abstract) in Review of Economic Studies,
66, 1999.
Hvide, H. K. (2001). Pragmatic Beliefs and Overconfidence. Forthcoming, Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization.
Jovanovic, B. (1979). Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover. Journal of Political
Economy, 87, 972-990.
MacDonald, G. (1982). A Market Equilibrium Theory of Job Assignment and Sequen-
tial Accumulation of Information. American Economic Review, 72, 1038-55.
Morris, S. (2001). An Instrumental Theory of Political Correctness. Forthcoming,
Journal of Political Economy.
Murphy, K., A. Shleifer, R. W. Vishny (1991). The Allocation of Talent: Implications
for Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 503-530.
Nöldeke, G. and E. van Damme (1990). Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market.
Review of Economic Studies, 57, 1-23.
Orzach, R. and Y. Tauman (1999). Strategic Dropouts. Draft, Recanati Business
School, Tel-Aviv University.
Prendergast, C. and L. Stole (1996). Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers:
Acquiring a Reputation for Learning. Journal of Political Economy, 104, 1105-34.
Prendergast, C. (2000). The Tenuous Tradeoﬀ Between Risk and Incentives. NBER
Working Paper# W7815.
Scharfstein, D. S. and J. C. Stein (1990). Herd Behavior and Investment, American
Economic Review, 80, 465-79.
Spence, A. M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87,
355-74.
37
Spence, A. M. (1974). Market Signaling. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1975). The Theory of Screening, Education, and the Distribution of
Income. American Economic Review, 71, 393-410.
Swinkels, J. M. (1999). Education Signalling with Preemptive Oﬀers. Mimeo, Olin
School of Management.
Weiss, A. (1983). A Sorting-cum-Learning Model of Education. Journal of Political
Economy, 91, 420-442.
Weiss, A. (1995). Human Capital versus Signalling Explanation of Wages. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 9, 133-54.
38
